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The Reykjavik Ministerial Meeting Df NATO 
A. Background 
The North Atlantic Council, in Ministerial session of 
Fo~eig~ Ministers will meet in Reykjavik, Iceland, June 24-25. 
This will be the first time that Iceland, a small but 
strategically located country of 200,000 people, has been 
the host for a NATO meeting. 
This session takes place less than one year before 
the 20th anniversary of the creation of NATO as a defense 
Alliance to deter aggression against Western Europe. 
As the Soviet Union emerged from Stalinist influence, 
the nature of the threat changed. Today, the polycentric 
tendencies within the Communist world, the evolution of 
Soviet society, plus affluence in the West, obscure tne 
fact that mounting Soviet capabilities still pose a danger 
to Western European security. 
Europe, long ago recovered from the effects of World 
~'lar II, noi:.·1 faces problems comrnon to affluent societies. 
Stable, prosperous and slightly smug, Western Europe has 
suddenly broken out in a rash of political and social crises. 
Among NATO members, France and Canada will have elections 
at the time of the NATO meeting. Italy and Belgium are 
trying to form governments. The US is in the process of 
preparing for Presidential elections. Greece is confronted 
with a junta looking for a nationally approved constitution. 
The faltering British pound has created he~vy pressure on 
the international monetary system. Despite all this, most 
of Europe has ample foreign exchange reserves and remains 
confident and firm. The economic structure is essentially 
sound. 
In this atmosphere, NATO's continued functioning on a 
broad front - military and political - constitutes a welcome 
element of stability, despite some strains within the Alliance. 
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B. Principal Issues at Reykjavik 
1 . EAST-WEST RELATIONS 
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The Ministers will discuss the general question of 
East-West relations . Views will be exchanged on recent 
dev~lopments in-Czechoslovakia , East Germany and Berlin . 
It is expected that the German Foreign Minister will report 
on the.Fed~ral Republic ' s relations with Eastern European 
countries in furtherance of its Ost-Politik . The improve-
ment of relations between East and West , and such matters 
as European security, will also be discussed . 
2. MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY 
Security developments in the Mediterranean will be 
an important issue in the meeting . The Ministers will address 
particularly the impact on NATO , and the NATO area , of 
increasing Soviet penetration into the Mediterranean. Ways 
and means of countering this growing military power in the 
Mediterranean will also be examined and recommendations 
considered on increased surveillance by NATO countries of 
USSR fleet moveme0ts, and the adoption of a watching brief 
for Brosio. 
3 . MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS 
The Foreign Ministers will also take up mutual force 
reductions. In February President Johnson indicated to 
NATO Secretary Brosio that "maintenance of NATO ' s strength , 
including the US commitment , is necessary to continuing 
stability and.security in the North Atlanti c area . This 
stability and security provides the basis for exploring 
with the USSR the possibility of mutual force reductions ." 
This question is under intensive study within NATO . 
The US has proposed for consideration at Reykjavik a resolution 
(declaration) on this issue which indicates NATO is study i ng 
the problem , expresses the hope that the USSR and o ther 
countries of Eastern Europe will also study it and be 
prepared at the proper time to explore such reduction~ 
together . The overall military capability o f the Al lianc e 
should not be reduced except as a part o f a patte r n o f 
mutual force reductions balanced in s c ope a nd timi ng . 
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4. NPT 
The negotiations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty have been the subject of intensive consultations in 
NATO . The Germans and others wish to discuss some of the 
implications of this Treaty at Reykjavik. The non-nuclear 
NATO powers have been concerned that their signing the 
Treaty would impair their security, especially in the 
nuclear field, particularly should the NPT duration outlast 
NATO. We have tried to meet their legitimate concerns and 
persuade them to support the NPT, and are prepared to make 
a supporting statement at Reykjavik on our continued 
commitment to NATO as an instrument for peace and stability 
in Europe. 
5. OTHER MATTERS 
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General tour d'horizon - the meeting will permit each 
Foreign ~1inister to give his views of the overall inter-
national situation. Secretary Rusk plans to meet in 
restricted session to discuss Vietnam and the European 
views on what they would like to see develop in Southeast 
Asia after peace is achieved . 
C. Long Range Problems and Outlook for the Future 
Above and beyond the issues on the official agenda at 
Reykjavik, certain general problems confront NATO: 
1. FUTURE VIABILITY OF NATO 
Foremost among these is the question of the future 
of the Alliance. French withdrawal from the integrated 
military aspects of NATO in 1966 caused many skeptics to 
doubt at that time whether the Alliance would have continued 
viability. The work of the organization since then has 
demonstrated that it can adjust to new conditions and 
continue as the keystone of Western collective security , 
even without French participation in its military aspects . 
We anticipate that there will be continued support . 
for NATO by the member governments . The governments parti-
cipating in its military structure continue.to recogn i ze 
that collective security is the most effective way t o e nsure 
national security . The French attitude notwithstandin g , 
we do not anticipate any members will take advantage of 
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Article XIII of the North Atlantic Treaty and give notice 
of withdra\val after its anniversary date (20 years) in 
1969. 
2. GREECE 
Developments in Greece with the take-over of the 
governme nt by a military junta have strained the bonds of 
the Alliance. -Many -~TO governments, notably in Scandinavia, 
the Low Countries and the UK have been sharply critical 
of the Greek regime. Pressures have been exerted in these 
countrie s to isolate Greece within the Alliance if not ) 
to expe l it, pending a return to constitutionality. While 
Greece r emains a full, interested and essential participan t 
in the Alliance, the Greek problem remains as a divisive 
factor. 
3. BURDEN SHARING 
We ~eep tryin~ to persuade the Europeans to i ncrease 
their own defen se efforts i n various ways, but this effort 
has met with little positive response to date. Nevertheless, 
we have negotiated successfully with some of our Allies on 
a bilateral basis in order to neutralize the balance of 
payments impact of our military expenditures. Arrangements 
for substantial neutralization have been concluded with the 
Germans and the Belg ians. Similar arrangements are well on 
the way to completion with the Danes, the Dutch and the 
Italians. 
D. Rey}sjavi~ and the Continued Importance of NATO to US 
NATO re n1ains essential to US security: 
1. In view of the current pattern of Soviet activity 
and current developments affecting Western and Eastern 
political stability, it is even more essential that the US 
maintain a consistent policy of support for a strong NATO. 
2. While maintaining this support, we must also be 
flexible enough to ensure that the Alliance is responsive 
to opportunities for easing tensions in Europe. NATO can 
become an increasingly effective instrument of detente . 
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3. We shall continue to study within NATO the possi-
bilities for exploring, with the Soviet Union and other 
countries of Eastern Europe, mutual force reductions. 
Conce~tra~ion will be primarily on the Central Region of 
NATO in light of the heavy confrontation there of forces 
of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Meanwhile, consistent with 
the Presid~nt's discussion with Brosio last February, we 
should strive to maintain overall NATO military strength. 
Unilateral troop reductions could undermine current efforts 
toward a balanced mutual reduction of forces. 
4. In the Mediterranean area, we see the Soviet threat 
as being primarily political, and we are recommending a set 
of modest, non-provocative political-military responses 
by NATO to this threat. · 
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5. Through the mechanism of the Nuclear Planning 
Group, we are studying ways for increased national parti-
cipation -- and thereby understanding -- in military nuclear 
planning and for developing a sounder basis for NATO mili-
tary planning with respect to the use of tactical nuclear 
weapons. 
6. We shall continue to try to work out arrangements 
to neutralize the effects of our military presence in Europe 
upon our balance of payments. 
7. We are committed through CY 1968 on US force levels 
in NATO. These US forces in Europe contribute to both the 
nuclear and conventional defense of the North Atlantic area. 
The US forces in Europe are a part of NATO's conventional 
defenses as well as acting as custodians for the tactical 
nuclear weapons that we maintain there. They also provide 
an essential institutional link between NATO's conventional 
forces, largely supplied by the Europeans, and the strate?ic 
nuclear weapons which are almost wholly American. In addi-
tion, these units are an earnest of American leadership in 
the Alliance. 
8. For the future we must examine means for getting 
greater European participation in the defense o~ Eu~o~e, 
such as a European Defense Organization, or capitalizin? 
on the U.K. interest in the Continent as the result of its 
withdrawals East of Suez. 
